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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of uncertainty and flexible labour con-
tracts on the Research and Development (R&D) expenditure. Using a panel
of Italian manufacturing firms, we find a hump-shaped relationship between
workforce flexibility and R&D outlays. Moreover, as predicted by the real
options theory, our results suggest that product market uncertainty reduces
R&D efforts and that flexible labour contracts countervail the adverse effect
of uncertainty on R&D.
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1 Introduction
Firms’ R&D investment is crucial to the development of new products and pro-
cesses, and the improvement of existing ones. A recent strand of the literature has
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highlighted the role played by uncertainty on R&D investments. In particular,
empirical evidence both at a macro (Goel and Ram, 2001) and a micro (Czarnitzki
and Toole, 2007, 2011) level suggests that higher uncertainty reduces current R&D
investments, and that firms react to the incentives able to reduce the effects of
uncertainty, such as patents and R&D subsidies.
This paper argues that the adverse effects of uncertainty may also be coun-
tervailed by making the firms’ cost structure more flexible through the use of
fixed-term workers. In case of unfavourable market conditions, by increasing the
control over future cost adjustments, firms reduce the adverse effects of uncer-
tainty and, consequently, may increase R&D investments. By using a panel of
Italian manufacturing firms, we provide empirical evidence of this mechanism.
In addition, this article evaluates whether, and to what extent, the use of flex-
ible labour influence the level of private R&D investment. Technological change
often requires labour reallocation, while tight labour market regulations can slow
labour flows among firms and industries. As a consequence, resources are alloc-
ated more efficiently in a flexible regime and, thus, investments raise. By contrast,
as the share of flexible workers grows, other forces may lead to the opposite res-
ult. For instance, it becomes more difficult to retain knowledge within firms and
keep high levels of workers’ loyalty and commitment, leading to lower R&D in-
vestments (Zhou et al., 2011). Our estimates detect a non-monotonic relationship
between R&D expenditure and the use of flexible labour. Thus, we infer that
flexibility is needed to allow firms to reach their optimal level of R&D, but there
is a threshold beyond which more flexibility becomes harmful. The results are
robust to different specifications of the baseline model and three variants of the
uncertainty measure, and are also confirmed when the share of fixed term workers
is treated as an endogenous regressor.
The evidence presented in this paper is also intended to better inform the
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policy debate on labour market reforms. The inverse U-shaped relationship between
flexible labour and R&D implies that excessive regulation is detrimental to the
optimal choices of innovating firms, but excessive deregulation could result in ef-
ficiency gains achieved through short-run employment practises dominating the
gains from long-run innovation strategies, leading to lower innovative efforts and,
consequently, to lower innovation, welfare and growth.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant
literature and states our research purposes. Section 3 deals with data, variables
and methods. The empirical findings are presented in section 4 while section 5
concludes.
2 Literature review and research questions
Recent developments in the theory of investment have shown that simple rules
based on the Net Present Value (NPV) of expected cash flows are not as accurate
as one may wish in explaining firms’ investment decisions. In particular, real
options investment theory predicts that the interaction between uncertainty and
the degree of investment irreversibility1 leads firms to put value on the option
to wait and, thus, to alter the optimal level of current investments as compared
to those predicted by a NPV rule of thumb2. Following the work of Pindyck
(1991) and Dixit (1992), Abel et al. (1996) provide a general framework in which
the effect of uncertainty on the current incentive to invest is determined by the
exercise of expandability and reversibility options, where the former refers to the
possibility of delaying an investment at some point in the future, thus it decreases
current investments for increasing levels of uncertainty, while the latter refers to
the possibility of disinvesting at some point in the future, thus it increases current
investments for increasing levels of uncertainty. The exercise of these options is
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based on a cost-benefit analysis and determines the sign and magnitude of the
overall effect of uncertainty on firms’ investment decision.
R&D is often considered as an investment with low or null reversibility, be-
cause it requires the purchase of capital and labour services that do not directly
increase production (e.g. research equipment, establishing and maintaining labor-
atories, salaries of research personnel). If one acknowledges that R&D investment
has a high degree of irreversibility, the impact of uncertainty on R&D investments
is negative because only the expandability option can be exercised by firms. Sur-
prisingly, only few studies examine this relationship empirically3. Goel and Ram
(2001) adopt the 5-year moving standard deviation of inflation and the 5-year
moving average of inflation as measures of uncertainty and confirm the adverse
effect of uncertainty on the share of R&D over GDP for a panel of OECD coun-
tries. Minton and Schrand (1999) use Compustat data to relate, among other
variables, R&D costs to cash flow volatility. They also find evidence of a negative
relationship between uncertainty and R&D expenditure. Finally, Czarnitzki and
Toole (2007, 2011) come to similar conclusions by focusing on measures of product
market uncertainty. Our first objective is, thus, to contribute to this literature by
offering empirical evidence for the Italian case.
A second goal of this paper is to incorporate a measure of flexible labour in the
above mentioned empirical literature to investigate whether the legal framework
governing the relationships between employers and employees affects the R&D
expenditure of firms. There is a growing interest in the role played by labour
market institutions on the ability of firms and countries to innovate. From a
theoretical point of view, Saint-Paul (2002) develop a model in which rigidities in
the labour market, formalised through firing restrictions, have implications on the
incentives for R&D investments. They show that countries with more stringent
labor market regulations will tend to produce relatively secure goods, thus they
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will tend to specialise in innovations aimed at improving existing products, rather
than innovations aimed at introducing new products. This prediction emerges
empirically in most studies based on aggregate data4, while few authors have
attempted so far to investigate this relationship on a micro basis. From this point
of view, several theoretical motivations can help us understand the relevance of
flexible employer-employee relations. First, let consider the knowledge stock of
a firm as proxied by the accumulation of past R&D investments (Bloom, 2007).
Shorter job tenure may weaken the knowledge accumulation process within the
organisation and increase the risk of revealing trade secrets and technological
knowledge to competitors, leading to lower investments in R&D. At the same time,
if short-term contracts are used as a screening device, firms are able to select high
ability workers among the pull of job applicants. Higher levels of skills within the
firm may trigger higher R&D efforts. Third, lower protection against dismissals
may reduce the unions’ power to bargain over future wages and, consequently,
the ability of appropriating the rent generated by innovations. It follows that the
R&D incentive is greater in a flexible regime where firms are able to capture a
greater share of the returns to innovative investments. Fourth, labour flexibility
can have an impact on the R&D expenditure through its effect on productivity.
Several studies have explored this relation both theoretically and empirically, but
no consensus has been reached on the sign of the effect5. Technological change
often requires labour reallocation, while firing restrictions can slow labour flows
among firms and industries. As a result, resources are allocated more efficiently
in a flexible regime and, thus, investments rise6. At the same time, both firms
and workers may reduce investments in specific human capital because of the
shorter expected duration of a contract, thus productivity falls (Dolado et al.,
2002). However, the fall in productivity might only be temporary (Boeri and
Garibaldi, 2007) and sufficiently high rates of conversion of temporary contracts
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into permanent ones may induce fixed-term workers to work harder (Dolado and
Stucchi, 2008).
Given the overall theoretical ambiguity, this study contributes to the debate
by offering empirical evidence of the overall effect of labour flexibility on R&D
expenditures at the firm level. In particular, the interaction among these forces
may produce a non linear dependence patter between temporary workforce and
R&D investments, thus we test the hypothesis of a non-monotonic relationship
through the inclusion of a linear and a squared term in the empirical model.
Quantitative work relating the use of fixed-term contracts to innovative activities
is still inconclusive. Serrano and Altuzarra (2010) test the presence of a non-
linear relationship between the share of fixed-term workers and a dichotomous
indicator of R&D activities. Even though the sign of the coefficients supports
their hypothesis, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Arvanitis (2005)
uses cross sectional data on Swiss enterprises and finds mixed results of the impact
of flexibility on measures of product and process innovation. Michie and Sheehan
(1999) find that short-term contracts have a negative effect on investment in R&D
and new technologies.
A further contribution of the present study is to quantify the effect of the
interplay of workforce flexibility and uncertainty on the R&D expenditure. We
provide two explanations why, in the presence of uncertainty about future returns,
flexible labour may have an impact on R&D. First, consider the case in which
temporary workers are part of the research personnel. As pointed out by Pindyck
(1991), [..] investments in new (permanent) workers may be partly irreversible
because of high costs of hiring, training, and firing [..]. In light of the real options
investment theory, it means that firms are left with the expandability option
alone. Thus, more uncertainty increases the value of deferring hiring permanent
workers. This in turn implies lower R&D investments. The use of temporary
6
contracts brings new opportunities to the firms because it partially restores the
reversibility option of the investment. Indeed, temporary contracts usually can be
terminated at will and at little cost by employers. It follows that flexible labour
have an impact on R&D investments to the extent that it is able to countervail
the adverse effects of uncertainty. Now consider the case in which temporary
workers are employed in the production process. Since one of the aims of the R&D
investments is to ultimately introduce new products in the market, firms may face
workforce expansion decisions to implement the new developed products. Since
firms exhibit a forward-looking behaviour, they know that the worsening of market
conditions will eventually brings losses that firms may try to offset by adjusting
their labour force, but this is a viable strategy only if part of the workforce is
hired under flexible contracts with low firing restrictions. Again, more flexibility
increases current R&D investments because firms insure themselves by increasing
their control over future labour costs. In both scenarios, more flexibility leads to
higher R&D investments. This implication is empirically testable, but because of
limitations in the data, it is not possible to distinguish between the two channels.
To the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of empirical evidence on this
topic. To check if the presence of temporary workers is able to mitigate the effect
of uncertainty, we include in the empirical model an interaction term between
the share of fixed-term workers and the level of uncertainty. We find evidence in
support of our hypothesis.
3 Data, variables and methods
3.1 Data, variables and summary statistics
This paper uses micro data from the eighth and ninth waves of the Survey of
Italian Manufacturing Firms (SIMF) collected, respectively, in 2001 and 2004 by
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Capitalia Bank Research Centre 7. The dataset contains a unique combination of
self-reported measures of R&D expenditures and information on fixed-term and
permanent labour contracts which is well suited to analyse the effect of flexible
labour contracts on firms’ innovation activity.
The SIMF is carried out every three years and deliver information on the three
years prior to the interview, thus the overall time dimension of the waves that we
consider span from 1998 to 2003. Each survey is a representative sample of Italian
manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees8. Nese and O’Higgins (2007)
discuss the problem of panel attrition in the SIMF and they advice against the
use of more than two consecutive waves when trying to build a panel. For this
reason, and to avoid overlap with structural reforms of the Italian labour market,
we decided to consider the 2001 and 2004 waves of the available surveys9. By
merging the two waves, we build a panel of 2136 firms. Among them, we select
those firms with a positive R&D expenditure at least in one year (around 47% of
all firms). Then, firms with missing years and/or missing or inconsistent data are
excluded from the analysis. As it will be clarified in the following, the uncertainty
measure at time t is build by using information, alternatively, of the 2, 3 or all
previous available years. Thus, the final sample includes 800 firms observed over
the period 1998-2003, while the estimates cover the period 2000-200310.
As dependent variable, we use an input-based measure of firms’ R&D activity,
namely yearly R&D expenditure in millions of euros11. Consistently with well
known stylised facts, firms in our sample show a high degree of persistency in R&D
investment behaviour. Indeed, by looking at transitional probabilities, around
90% of firm-year observations that undertook such investment at time t, did it
also at time t+ 1. Moreover, more than 67% of those who did not invest at time
t, did not invest also at time t+ 1.
Among all the possible kinds of investment a firm might undertake, R&D is
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probably the most sensitive to uncertainty. In particular, given the framework of
this study, product market uncertainty seems to be a natural candidate to describe
the kind of uncertainty that firms take into account while deciding the R&D effort.
Moreover, Czarnitzki and Toole (2007) clarify that this measure may also capture
both consumer demand and competitive pressures in the marketplace. For these
reasons, uncertainty at time t has been proxied by the standard deviation of
past revenue from sales per employee normalised by the average revenue from
sales per employee in firm’s operating industry12. Note that dividing firm’s sales
by the number of employees is intended to purge from firm size effects, while
the normalisation procedure should be able to eliminate, or at least mitigate,
differences in trends and industry specific characteristics both at demand and
product level13. To check the stability of our results, we compute three versions of
the uncertainty measure. The first one uses information of the previous two years,
the second uses information of the previous three years, while the third is based
on all past information contained in the data, thus the number of observations
available for each firm varies from two to five. The uncertainty measure reflects
revenues volatility, and we expect it to have a negative impact on firms’ R&D
investments.
To test the relationship between flexible labour relations and R&D expendit-
ure, the empirical model includes the share of temporary workers over the firm
workforce.
In addition to the variables of interest, we add a rich set of control variables to
better explain firms’ innovative efforts14. First, we make use of a dummy for past
R&D expenditure to account for the persistency of R&D behaviour detected in
the sample. Also, firms in more technology-intensive industries may have a higher
propensity to conduct R&D than those in more labor-intensive sectors. Thus, the
model includes dummy variables for Pavitt sectors, namely technological, scale
9
and traditional industries. Moreover, because size reflects access to finance, scale
economies and differences in the organisation of work, we include dummies for firm
size measured by the number of employees at the firm15. Hirings and separations
of workers across firms embody information about knowledge circulation, and is
a potential source of spillovers. Thus, firms may benefit from knowledge inflow
and suffer from knowledge outflow simultaneously. To the extent that firm’s R&D
knowledge is primarily embodied in persons, high worker flows may result in lower
appropriability of workers’ knowledge and lower incentives to innovate. Therefore
we include in the model the coefficients of variation of inflow and outflow worker
turnover rates built on the ATECO classification. Finally, other firms’ charac-
teristics included in the model are: firm’s location, legal form, sales and squared
sales, investments in physical capital and workforce composition.
Summary statistics are reported in table 1.
3.2 Research methods
This section describes the methods used to test our research questions. Given the
structure of the data, we adopt a random-effect tobit model for panel data. In
particular, we interpret our dependent variable y as a corner solution response
variable, which takes the value 0 with positive probability and is a continuous
variable over strictly positive values. This means that some firms in our sample
find it optimal to set the R&D equal to zero. The tobit equation can be written as
yit = max (0, αi + xitβ + it), where yit is the observed R&D expenditure of firm i
at time t, αi is the unobserved firm-specific effect, xit is the set of regressors, β is
the set of parameters of interest and it|xit, αi ∼ N (0, σ2 ) is the error component.
We implement three different specifications of the empirical model. The first
one includes the uncertainty measure and is aimed at checking the prediction of
the real options investments theory. The second specification adds the share of
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Table 1: Summary statistics (1859 firm-year observations, 800 firms)
Variable Mean Std.Dev.
R&D expenditure 0.308 0.784
Uncertaintyt−1 0.083 0.222
Share of temporary workers 0.034 0.101
Average R&D intensityt−1 0.014 0.024
Dummy R&Dt−1 0.746 0.435
Revenuest−1 25.043 59.374
Investment in physical capitalt−1 0.873 2.557
Dummy large firm 0.114 0.317
Dummy medium firm 0.300 0.458
Dummy small firm 0.587 0.493
Pavitt sector: traditional 0.073 0.260
Pavitt sector: special 0.374 0.484
Pavitt sector: technological 0.554 0.497
Dummy corporations 0.985 0.122
Northern firms 0.729 0.445
Share of executivest−1 0.017 0.029
Share of high level white collarst−1 0.019 0.038
Share of low level white collarst−1 0.262 0.164
Share of blue collarst−1 0.648 0.184
Worker inflow ratet−1 0.115 0.217
Worker outflow ratet−1 0.095 0.193
Coefficient of variation of worker inflow ratet−1 0.398 0.344
Coefficient of variation of worker outflow ratet−1 0.409 0.358
Notes: Nominal variables are in millions of euros. Uncertainty has been proxied by
the standard deviation of past two years revenue from sales per employee normalised
by the average revenue from sales per employee in firms operating industry. Average
R&D intensity is defined as the two-years average of the ratio of R&D expenditure over
revenues from sales. The size of firms is proxied by a dummy for small (lower than
50 employees), medium (from 51 to 250 employees) and large firms (more than 250
employees). Worker inflow (outflow) rate is the ratio of hirings (separations) over the
workforce.
temporary workers and its squared value to identify the direct effect of flexible
labour relations on the R&D investment. The last specification also considers
the interaction term between uncertainty and the share of temporary workers
to identify the joint effect of temporary workers and uncertainty on the R&D
expenditure. Each model specification has been replicated for each version of the
uncertainty measure. We would also like to be confident that our strategy is able
to identify real options investment behaviour. As in Czarnitzki and Toole (2007),
we assume that each firm’s risk preferences are related to its recent innovation
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strategy. While the authors use the average share of new product sales relative
to each firm’s industry to describe past innovation strategy, we use the two-years
average of past R&D intensity. This variable should capture firms’ risk preferences
and will increase the credibility of the results.
A major concern in our empirical strategy is that there might be a problem
of endogeneity of the fraction of flexible workers over the firm’s workforce due
to the potential correlation between the flexibility measure and the error term.
In order to validate the results, we adopt a simultaneous equation tobit model
similar to the one described in Smith and Blundell (1986), with the only difference
being that our potential endogenous regressor is left-censored at zero and right-
censored at one. The method is a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we
estimate a reduced form equation by tobit in which the share of flexible contracts
is explained by its lagged value, lagged uncertainty, lagged outflow and inflow
turnover rates, lagged revenues and its squared value, firm size and industry,
location and workforce composition. The residuals from the first stage are plugged
into the tobit estimation of the R&D equation. Exogeneity is then evaluated by
means of a simple t-statistics on the coefficient of the first stage residuals vˆit.
In particular, if we can not reject the null hypothesis, the fraction of temporary
workers is an endogenous regressor and the standard errors for the R&D equation
are not valid. Instead, if exogeneity is confirmed by the t-test, a further check is
to compare the estimated coefficients of the two tobit regressions as suggested by
Czarnitzki and Toole (2011). If we do not reject the exogeneity of the share of




The main results from the Tobit regressions are reported in tables 2 and 3. We
show the estimated coefficients for three model specifications and repeat the eco-
nometric exercise for each version of the uncertainty measure. Specifically, in table
2 we use the uncertainty measure computed as the two-years standard deviation
of past sales per-employee; in panel (a) of table 3 the uncertainty measure is the
three-years standard deviation of past sales per-employee; in panel (b) of table
3 the uncertainty measure is the standard deviation of past sales per-employee
for all available years. All the measures are normalised by the average sales per
employee in firm’s operating industry.
In line with real option theory and with previous empirical evidence, the coef-
ficient of the uncertainty variable has a negative sign in all the specifications,
meaning that greater uncertainty increases the value of the expandability option
and reduces current R&D investments because no reversibility option can be ex-
ercised by firms for each unit of capital that would be otherwise bought. In
particular, the magnitude of the effect is clustered around −0.1131 and −0.1793,
and it is always statistically significant at conventional levels. Note that when
the estimates include the interaction term, the coefficient of the uncertainty vari-
able is even stronger, probably because we purge for the positive impact that the
variable exert when combined with the level of flexible labour.
From model specifications 2 and 3 in table 2, we find some evidence of a
hump-shaped relationship between the use of flexible labour and the R&D ex-
penditure, even though in model 3 we lose significance of the linear term of the
share of temporary workers16. Of course, we are not able to identify which of
the effects outlined in section 2 tend to prevail, but still the estimates suggest
that a certain degree of flexibility is needed for innovation activities (measured
by the R&D expenditure). For lower levels of flexibility, an increase in the use
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Table 2: Tobit regressions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Uncertaintyt−1 -0.1141*** -0.1131*** -0.1297***
(-0.040) (-0.040) (-0.040)
Share of temporary workers 0.7623* 0.648
(-0.404) (-0.408)




Coefficient of variation of worker inflow ratet−1 -0.043 -0.042 -0.042
(-0.032) (-0.032) (-0.032)
Coefficient of variation of worker outflow ratet−1 0.024 0.024 0.020
(-0.031) (-0.031) (-0.031)
Dummy R&Dt−1 0.0377* 0.036 0.0380*
(-0.023) (-0.023) (-0.023)
Revenuest−1 0.0076*** 0.0076*** 0.0077***
(-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001)
Squared revenuest−1 -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy corporations 0.7163*** 0.7168*** 0.7100***
(-0.194) (-0.194) (-0.194)
Dummy large firm 0.4117*** 0.4185*** 0.4103***
(-0.087) (-0.087) (-0.087)
Dummy medium firm 0.1396*** 0.1457*** 0.1436***
(-0.047) (-0.048) (-0.047)
Pavitt sector: technological 0.3663*** 0.3543*** 0.3556***
(-0.102) (-0.102) (-0.102)
Pavitt sector: special 0.1155** 0.1127** 0.1132**
(-0.057) (-0.057) (-0.057)
Northern firms 0.039 0.037 0.038
(-0.060) (-0.060) (-0.060)
Share of executivest−1 0.279 0.265 0.253
(-0.425) (-0.424) (-0.423)
Share of high level white collarst−1 0.553 0.562 0.551
(-0.349) (-0.349) (-0.348)
Share of low level white collarst−1 0.4354** 0.4271** 0.4182**
(-0.182) (-0.182) (-0.181)
Share of blue collarst−1 -0.018 -0.029 -0.045
(-0.172) (-0.172) (-0.172)
Investment in physical capitalt−1 0.0145*** 0.0146*** 0.0145***
(-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004)
Constant -1.0456*** -1.0464*** -1.0258***
(-0.251) (-0.250) (-0.250)
Notes: The dependent variable is the R&D expenditure. ***, **, * denote, respectively, significance at 1%,
5% and 10%. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The sample corresponds to 800 firms observed over the
period 2000-2003. Among the 1859 firm-year observations, 461 are left-censored. Nominal variables are in
millions of euros. Uncertainty has been proxied by the standard deviation of past two years revenue from sales
per employee normalised by the average revenue from sales per employee in firms operating industry. The
interaction term is the product of the share of temporary workers times the uncertainty. The size of firms is
proxied by a dummy for small (lower than 50 employees), medium (from 51 to 250 employees) and large firms
(more than 250 employees). Worker inflow (outflow) rate is the ratio of hirings (separations) over the workforce.
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of fixed-term contracts tends to raise ceteris paribus the R&D expenditure, but
only up to a threshold. Indeed, for higher levels of flexibility, the coefficient of
the quadratic term tends to offset the positive impact of the linear term, and the
R&D expenditure is decreasing in the share of fixed-term workers. Intuitively,
a less regulated labour market makes room for efficiency gains achieved through
short-run employment practises, which may dominate the gains from long-run
innovation strategies. At the same time, a stringent regulation prevents firms to
mitigate the negative effects of uncertainty with the consequence of lower R&D
investments. In particular, the joint effect of the use of temporary workers and the
uncertainty levels on the R&D expenditure is captured by the interaction term.
The estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant. This is a novel
result in the literature and supports the idea that firms may expand R&D efforts
as long as they can exercise a reversibility option on the investment in temporary
workers.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the overall effect of uncertainty
and flexible labour on the R&D expenditure. We plot the patterns of R&D for
increasing levels of flexibility (measured on the x−axis as the share of fixed-
term contracts over the firm workforce); each line is drawn for a given level of
uncertainty. In the absence of flexibility, an increase in uncertainty is associated
to a decrease of the R&D level. With increasing flexibility, first we observe that the
effect of uncertainty on R&D is gradually less intense, but still negative. Then,
after a threshold (around 11% of flexibility) the effect of uncertainty becomes
positive. At the same time, if we keep constant the level of uncertainty, we notice
that there is always a hump-shaped relation between the level of flexibility and the
amount of resources allocated to R&D. Moreover, the level of flexibility beyond
which more flexibility decreases R&D is increasing in the level of uncertainty.
As far as the coefficients of the control variables are concerned, several of them
15


















Share of temporary workers
are significant and have the expected signs. The tobit results indicate that past
revenues and physical capital investments have a positive impact on firms’ R&D
effort. The positive effect of past revenues might reflect an increasing capability
of carrying out investments in R&D because of better cash flows, but it could also
be an indicator of successful performances linked to past innovation. Consistent
with previous empirical studies, we also find that the effect of firm size is positive
and significant. Larger firms show a higher commitment to innovating strategies
because of easier access to finance, scale economies and differences in the organ-
isation of work. We also reach the conclusion that higher investments are achieved
in special and technological Pavitt sectors as compared to the reference sector,
namely the traditional sector. Finally, corporations tend to invest more.
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Table 3: Tobit regressions
(a) (b)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Uncertaintyt−1 -0.1520*** -0.1509*** -0.1640*** -0.1659*** -0.1653*** -0.1797***
(-0.043) (-0.043) (-0.044) (-0.048) (-0.048) (-0.048)
Share of temporary workers 0.7543* 0.555 0.7549* 0.5607
(-0.403) (-0.420) (-0.403) (-0.419)
Squared Share of temporary workers -1.2042** -1.2480** -1.2085** -1.2534**
(-0.571) (-0.569) (-0.571) (-0.419)
Interaction term 1.3762* 1.3549*
(-0.759) (-0.747)
Notes: The dependent variable is the R&D expenditure. ***, **, * denote, respectively, significance at 1%,
5% and 10%. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The sample corresponds to 800 firms observed over the
period 2000-2003. Among the 1859 firm-year observations, 461 are left-censored. Nominal variables are in
millions of euros. In panel (a) uncertainty has been proxied by the standard deviation of past three years
revenue from sales per employee normalised by the average revenue from sales per employee in firms operating
industry. In panel (b) the uncertainty measure refers to all previous available years. The interaction term
is the product of the share of temporary workers times the uncertainty. The coefficients of all the control
variables are available upon request. Since there were not substantial differences in terms of sign, magnitude
and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients of the control variables with respect to table 2, the
table reports only the information concerning the variables for which we have formulated specific hypotheses.
Table 3 summarises the results based on the two variants of our measure of
uncertainty17. It is straightforward to see that the results are in line with those
already presented in table 2.
To be confident that the estimates presented so far describe real options in-
vestment behaviour, we also show the results where we add a control variable
for firm’s risk preferences. In particular, we expect each firm’s past innovation
strategies to be related to its risk aversion18. Therefore, we proxy past innovation
strategies with the average R&D intensity19 of the previous two years, and we
assume that risk-aversion is inversely related to R&D intensity. Table 4 reports
the estimated coefficients. The average R&D intensity is always positive and sig-
nificant, meaning that firms that have invested heavily in the past are those that
invest more today. In this way, we believe that this variable is able to capture
risk preferences and that the coefficient of the uncertainty measure reflects real
options investment behaviour.
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Table 4: Tobit regressions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Uncertaintyt−1 -0.1096*** -0.1091*** -0.1258***
(-0.040) (-0.040) (-0.041)
Share of temporary workers 0.5576 0.4427
(-0.405) (-0.410)




Average R&D intensityt−1 1.2430** 1.2184** 1.2035**
(-0.538) (-0.538) (-0.537)
Notes: The dependent variable is the R&D expenditure. ***, **, * denote, respectively, significance at 1%,
5% and 10%. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The sample corresponds to 800 firms observed over the
period 2000-2003. Among the 1859 firm-year observations, 461 are left-censored. Nominal variables are in
millions of euros. Uncertainty has been proxied by the standard deviation of past two years revenue from
sales per employee normalised by the average revenue from sales per employee in firms operating industry.
The interaction term is the product of the share of temporary workers times the uncertainty. Average R&D
intensity is defined as the two-years average of the ratio of R&D expenditure over revenues from sales. The
coefficients of all the control variables are available upon request. Since there were not substantial differences
in terms of sign, magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients of the control variables
with respect to table 2, the table reports only the information concerning the variables for which we have
formulated specific hypotheses.
4.1 Endogeneity check
Table 5 presents the results from the two-stage Smith-Blundell procedure outlined
in section 3.2, which is intended to check for the potential endogeneity of the
share of flexible labour contracts. In particular, both panel (a) and (b) report the
coefficients of the variables referring to our research questions and the coefficients
of the first stage residuals. Panel (b) adds the results of the estimates including the
average R&D intensity20. It is straightforward to notice that, in both panels, the
first stage residuals are not statistically different from zero. Moreover, we obtain
large p-values, 0.637 for the residuals in panel (a) and 0.543 in panel (b). Thus,
we do not reject the exogeneity of the share of temporary workers in the R&D
equation. It is also worth noting that once we include the first stage residuals in
the second stage regression, the estimated coefficients are in line with the ones
presented in table 2.
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Table 5: Two-stage Tobit model
(a) (b)




Share of temporary workers 0.7075* 0.5184
(-0.428) (-0.428)
Squared Share of temporary workers -1.2805** -1.0219*
(-0.572) (-0.567)
Interaction term 1.1146* 1.1187*
(-0.581) (-0.578)
Average R&D intensityt−1 1.1999**
(-0.537)
Notes: The dependent variable is the R&D expenditure. ***, **, * denote, respectively, significance at 1%,
5% and 10%. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The sample corresponds to 800 firms observed over the
period 2000-2003. Among the 1859 firm-year observations, 461 are left-censored. Nominal variables are in
millions of euros. First stage residuals are obtained after the tobit estimation of a reduced form equation in
which the share of flexible contracts is explained by its lagged value, lagged uncertainty, lagged outflow and
inflow turnover rates, lagged revenues and its squared value, firm size and industry, location and workforce
composition. Uncertainty has been proxied by the standard deviation of past two years revenue from sales
per employee normalised by the average revenue from sales per employee in firms operating industry. The
interaction term is the product of the share of temporary workers times the uncertainty. Panel (a) does not
include the average R&D intensity. Average R&D intensity is defined as the two-years average of the ratio of
R&D expenditure over revenues from sales. The first stage results, along with the coefficients of all the control
variables, are available upon request. Since there were not substantial differences in terms of sign, magnitude
and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients of the control variables with respect to table 2, the
table reports only the information concerning the variables for which we have formulated specific hypotheses.
5 Conclusions
This paper documents empirical evidence of the effects of uncertainty and flexible
labour relations on the R&D outlays of a sample of Italian manufacturing firms
over the period 2000-2003. Coherently with real options investment theory, the
irreversible nature of R&D implies a negative relation between uncertainty and
R&D expenditure. This study also extends previous empirical works by including
a firm level measure of workforce flexibility and its interaction with product mar-
ket uncertainty measured by the standard deviation of past sales per employee
normalised by the average sales per employee in firm’s operating industry. We
identify a non-monotonic impact of flexible labour on R&D and a positive impact
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of the interaction term.
While this study provides evidence that flexible labour mitigate the effect of
product market uncertainty on private R&D effort, there are some caveats to bear
in mind. First, our measure of uncertainty is build on past firm experience and
does not take into account other mechanisms that might influence the process
through which firms formulate the expected level of market uncertainty. If these
mechanisms are larger than we believe, then our measure is weakened and the
estimation results are less accurate. Second, due to available data, we can not
distinguish between new and existing product sales. Future analysis with a more
accurate measure of sales could improve the point estimates of our analysis.
We believe that our results are also informative for the ongoing debate on
labour market reforms. Excess deregulation could generate a trade off between
efficiency gains achieved through short-run employment practises and the gains
from long-run innovation strategies.
Notes
1To use Pindyck’s (1991) terminology, irreversible expenditures are sunk costs that cannot
be recovered.
2Even in a world with uncertainty, a theory based on completely reversible investments is
not able to generate this feature because every investment could be in principle recoupable at a
later date.
3Empirical evidence of a negative relationship between uncertainty and irreversible invest-
ment can be found, among others, in Episcopos (1995) and Bulan (2005). For a comprehensive
survey, see Carruth et al. (2000).
4See, for instance, Barbosa and Faria (2011)
5See, among others, Lucidi and Kleinknecht (2010) and Kleinknecht et al. (2006).
6See Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993, Bertola, 1994 and Samaniego, 2006for different formal
approaches.
7Originally, the survey was undertaken by Mediocredito Centrale. It was a bank specialised
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in international finance and industrial finance. In 2002, Mediocredito Centrale was taken over
by the Capitalia group, the third largest banking group in Italy.
8Representativeness has been preserved through stratification by gross product per employee,
size, industry, and location.
9It is worth noting that our observational window does not include substantial changes in
regulations. Relatively to our observational window, even if two main reforms of the Italian
labour market passed in 2001 and in 2003, they were implemented only starting in 2005.
10Nominal variables have been corrected for inflation according to the official Italian Consumer
Price Index
11The data do not contain information to build output-based measures of R&D, such as the
number of patents.
12In order to identify firms’ operating industries, we make use of Pavitt and ATECO taxonom-
ies. First, the classes of economic activities are disaggregated according to Pavitt’s taxonomy.
They include: traditional sectors, scale sectors, specialised sectors and high-technology sectors.
Then, among these classes, we rely on the three-digit ATECO classification to define the set of
industries. The ATECO classification is the Italian version of the European NACE codes (No-
menclature Statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté Européenne) adopted by
the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) to produce internationally comparable economic data.
13For instance, differences in the speed of adoption of a new product can vary a lot among
industries because of differences in consumers and producers behaviour. By normalising firm’s
revenues per employee by the average revenue from sales per employee in firm’s operating in-
dustry, we restrict the variability of our uncertainty measure to industry specificities.
14It is worth noting that we use both time-invariant regressors to reduce the error variance
(Wooldridge, 2002) and lagged values of time-varying variables in order to treat regressors as
predetermined. See Czarnitzki and Toole (2011) for a similar approach.
15We construct dummies for small (lower than 50 employees), medium (from 51 to 250 em-
ployees) and large firms (more than 250 employees).
16With respect to the three measures of uncertainty, the p-values of the coefficient of the share
of temporary workers are, respectively, 0.113, 0.186 and 0.164.
17Since there were not substantial differences in terms of sign, magnitude and statistical
significance of the estimated coefficients of the control variables, the table reports only the
information concerning the variables for which we have formulated specific hypotheses. Complete
tables are available upon request.
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18See Czarnitzki and Toole (2007) for a similar check.
19R&D intensity is defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure over revenues from sales.
20The table does not report the estimated coefficients of the control variables and the results
from the first stage analysis. The complete tables are available upon request.
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